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Doctrine, Training and Education
in the Development of Canadian
Brigadiers
A Study of Brigadiers Robert Moncel and
James Jefferson
NICHOLAS WHEELER
Abstract : This paper argues that Anglo-Canadian doctrine had a
greater influence on how Brigadiers Robert Moncel and James Jefferson
commanded their brigades than the experience they gained along two
different career paths. The rapid expansion of the Canadian Army during
the Second World War prevented Canadian infantry and armoured
brigade commanders from gaining experience in both staff and command
billets. As junior or senior officers, future brigade commanders normally
attended either a condensed version of Staff College or Senior Officers’
School. Here they developed two distinct skill sets before they assumed
command of brigades. Despite the differing purposes of these course,
the doctrine used provided an institutional language that transcended
the experience gained by officers as they progressed in their careers. By
examining the pre-war and wartime careers of Moncel and Jefferson and
how they commanded their brigades in Operation Suitcase, it is clear
doctrine had a greater influence on how they planned and fought their
formations.

C

followed two paths to brigade command in
the Second World War. In the British Army, officer training
involved a mix of unit and staff experience and attending British
courses such as Staff College at Camberley or Quetta and Senior
Officer School at Sheerness. Following this path gave officers the
necessary training and education along with a good mix of experience
as they progressed in their careers and prepared for command.
anadian officers
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Moreover, following a standardised method of officer development
would produce commanders with a common understanding of
operations. As the Canadian Army modelled itself after its British
counterpart, Canadian officers ideally would have followed the same
model. But during the interwar period, the focus on training NonPermanent Active Militia (NPAM) units, the reliance on the British
Army for vacancies on professional courses and a lack of funds
for collective training prevented Canadian Permanent Force (PF)
officers from gaining this level and diversity of experience. NPAM
officers, who had to balance their military and civilian careers,
could hardly be expected to gain the same breadth of experience
as a British Regular Army or Canadian PF officer. When Canada
declared war on Germany in September 1939, it had few officers with
the necessary training or experience to command its infantry and
armoured brigades.
The poor state of Canada’s pre-war army and the rapid expansion
of the force during the Second World War created the need for a new
cadre of brigade commanders. While existing senior officers filled
these positions early in the war, they were normally found wanting
for several reasons such as age, poor health or an inability to adapt
their understanding of military operations to the contemporary
battlefield. But the pressure to produce sufficient brigadiers to
command all twelve infantry and four armour brigades condensed
the training process and prevented officers from gaining operational
experience in both staff and command positions. After 1940, officers,
such as Brigadiers Robert Moncel and James Jefferson, instead
developed along command or staff career paths prior to assuming
command of a brigade. Moncel, a staff officer, took command of
4th Canadian Armoured Brigade (4th CAB) in August 1944. With
little command experience, his path to brigade command largely
consisted of performing exceptionally well in staff positions in a
training environment and during the Normandy Campaign. Jefferson
assumed command of 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade (10th CIB)
in February 1944 after a successful tour as the commanding officer
of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment in Sicily and Italy. LieutenantGeneral (Lt.-Gen.) Harry Crerar, General Officer Commanding-inChief First Canadian Army, handpicked Jefferson to command the
brigade as part of the program to integrate Mediterranean veterans
into the inexperienced First Canadian Army. Unlike Moncel, he did
not complete wartime staff training or serve on a formation staff. In
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this respect, the two officers developed different skill sets in training
and operations prior to assuming command of a brigade—one the
consummate staff officer, the other a battle-tested unit commander.
Although they progressed along different career paths, both
trained with and used the same doctrine. In general terms, doctrine
provides a common understanding of how military forces are organised,
think and operate. In the case of Moncel and Jefferson, training and
courses during the interwar period and in England after September
1939 exposed them to the common language and organisation laid
out in the series of Field Service Regulations (FSRs) and military
training pamphlets published and updated periodically by the British
Army since 1909. The intent behind the adoption of the FSRs was
to create a homogenous Imperial Army that looked, thought and
fought identically.1 Theoretically, the FSRs provided an institutional
language that transcended the experience gained by officers as they
progressed in their careers. Experience was important and officers
gained different skill sets as they progressed through staff and
command billets, but ideally it did not alter their understanding of
doctrine. So, regardless of staff or command experience, training
based on the FSRs imbued officers with a common understanding
of operations.
But as Moncel and Jefferson progressed towards brigade command,
they had to adapt their understanding of the FSRs to Field Marshal
Bernard Montgomery’s set-piece tactical doctrine.2 Montgomery’s
familiarity with doctrine came from a lifetime of experience and
training as a professional officer—including education at Sandhurst,
service in the First World War, graduating from Staff College at
Camberley and serving on the directing staffs at both Camberley
and Quetta. Additionally, British operations in North Africa taught
Montgomery that decentralised command, a dispersion of forces
and artillery and a lack of an overarching operational plan were
the primary reasons for their setbacks in the desert. After assuming
command of Eighth Army in August 1942, Montgomery reinstituted
key elements of the FSRs while adapting others. This in turn drove
Douglas E. Delaney, The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of
the Dominions and India, 1902-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 41.
2  
Stephen A. Hart, Montgomery and “Colossal Cracks”: 21st Army Group in
Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (London: Praeger Publishers, 2000). Hart provides
the best analysis on the development and employment of Montgomery’s set-piece
battle doctrine.
1  
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the adoption of an artillery-based battle doctrine that reflected a
top-down approach to operations where the commander concentrated
his resources at the decisive point of the operation. A master plan,
developed and rigidly controlled by commanders, sought to achieve
limited objectives using mass artillery support. Having secured and
consolidated on their objectives, Commonwealth forces sought to
defeat the inevitable German counterattacks before executing the
next phase of operations from a firm base. Subordinate commanders
could still use their initiative in operations, but within the intent
outline in the master plan. Deep manoeuvres that extended outside
the range of artillery support assumed an inordinate amount of risk
when facing German depth defensive positions. Such operations
normally resulted in heavy casualties, which the Anglo-Canadian
armies could ill afford. Montgomery never lost sight of this fact and
his set-piece tactical doctrine offered the possibility of mitigating
casualties while at the same time increasing the chance of operational
success by trading shells for lives.
Much of the language of Montgomery’s set-piece battle would
have been familiar to Moncel and Jefferson. Montgomery’s use of
artillery followed the recommended use outlined in FSRs Volume
II: Operations – General (1935).3 However, Montgomery’s preference
for rigid top-down command was a by-product of his experience in
the war and the nature of the Commonwealth forces. The FSRs
emphasised that subordinate commanders be given a high degree
of freedom to determine how to accomplish a task within the intent
of the higher commander—something that required a high degree
of professional knowledge and experience to be effectively used in
operations.4 But Montgomery recognised that the rapid expansion
of Commonwealth forces necessitated a more centralised planning
and command structure to overcome the relative inexperience of
his officers—something part-time soldiers like Moncel and Jefferson
typified. David French has argued that “Montgomery’s operational
doctrine was an amalgam of inter-war doctrine, the lessons that the
high command drew from operations in the field and in exercise […] and

3  
Field Service Regulations, Volume II Operations – General 1935 (London: His
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1935), 9, 127.
4  
Field Service Regulations, Volume II Operations – General 1935, 27-28.
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his own ruthless personality.”5 That said, Montgomery’s adaptation
of the FSRs should not be seen as a major shift in doctrinal language,
but as a linguistic dialect that could still be easily understood by
part-time, inexperienced officers like Moncel and Jefferson.
When it came to fighting battles, did the military experience of
Moncel and Jefferson matter more than the overarching doctrine they
learned in training and practiced in war? Operation Suitcase, the first
phase of 4th Canadian Armoured Division’s (4th CAD) operations to
open the port of Antwerp, provides an opportunity to examine how
two officers from different career paths commanded their brigades
in the same division. This operation marked the first occasion where
Moncel and Jefferson fought a division set-piece battle together. More
importantly, the near-identical groupings and tasks given to them
facilitates an examination of how they managed similar problems
with similar force structures.
Doctrine ultimately had a greater influence on how the two
brigadiers commanded their brigades than the experiences they
gained along two different career paths. This paper will first examine
the military careers of Moncel and Jefferson. By determining their
pre-war and wartime training and employment, it will contend that
while they developed different skill sets as they progressed towards
brigade command, doctrine provided a common understanding for
how they planned and executed operations. Subsequently, the paper
will examine how they commanded their brigades during the first
phase of Operation Suitcase—the advance to Esschen. During this
phase of operations, the two brigadiers fought similar battles with
equally balanced brigade groups. Moncel and Jefferson planned
operations and fought their brigades in a near identical manner,
suggesting that doctrine, whether it be the FSRs or Montgomery’s
set-piece tactical doctrine, had a greater influence than what they
had learned in their different career paths. Finally, the second phase
of Operation Suitcase—the capture of Wouwsche Plantage and
Bergen Op Zoom—will be explored. In this phase of the operation,
Moncel and Jefferson fought different battles but with similar force
structures. Despite the differing natures of their battles, evidence
again suggests that set-piece battle doctrine guided their actions. The
paper will conclude that in the cases of Moncel and Jefferson during
5  
David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against
Germany, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 246.
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Robert Moncel in March 1945. [Library and Archives Canada PA-113686]

Operation Suitcase, doctrine influenced their actions more than the
experience they gained as staff and command officers.

robert moncel
Born and raised in the wealthy Montreal suburb of Westmount,
Robert Moncel led a privileged upper middle-class life. He attended
elite private schools at Selwyn House and Bishop’s College, which
he believed were an important part of his personal and professional
development. Moncel undoubtedly had a bit of an elitist steak.
Later in life, he maintained that Non-Permanent Active Militia
(NPAM) officers and Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)
graduates who had attended private schools and joined urban
militia units performed better than their peers.6 As a student at
6  
J. L. Granatstein, The Weight of Command: Voices of Canada’s Second World War
Generals and Those Who Knew Them (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 77.
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McGill University, he joined the Victoria Rifles in 1937 as a second
lieutenant and paraded weekly with the unit, although he likely
gained only marginal military skill or experience in the two years
that he was there. At most, he participated in the normal training
schedule of one night a week, one weekend a month and potentially
a two-week summer training event. Training of this nature could
hardly have prepared him for modern war. The Second World War
cut short his post-secondary schooling and his militia career in any
event. Attesting on 30 September 1939, Moncel transferred to the
Royal Canadian Regiment and deployed to England with the 1st
Canadian Infantry Division (1st CID) in December. He participated
in the brief and aborted June 1940 deployment of the 1st Canadian
Brigade to France, as the Allies attempted, unsuccessfully, to halt the
German advance. Here he did gain some unit-level fame for refusing
to abandon his Bren-gun platoon’s vehicles during the evacuation or
even turn them over to British authorities when they safely landed
back in England.7 It was noble, but the brief episode did little to
augment Moncel’s professional knowledge or skill.
Moncel took his first significant step towards brigade command
when he attended the new Canadian Junior War Staff Course
(CJWSC). Conducted at Ford Manor under the supervision of then
Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt.-Col.) Guy Simonds, the course was designed
to meet the urgent need for staff officers in Canadian formations.
Like the British War Staff Course, the CJWSC adopted a fourmonth abbreviated version of the Camberley syllabus rooted in the
doctrine outlined in the FSRs. Students learned basic staff skills and
procedures, the theory of combined arms warfare, how to conduct
tactical appreciations, make plans, issue orders and employ tactics.8
While staff college normally developed second grade general staff
officers (GSOs II), usually majors, Simonds recognised that the
students’ inexperience and deficiency in tactical knowledge limited
the course to producing GSOs III, usually captains. He expected
graduates would continue their post-CJWSC development through
practical experience, self-development and employment as staff

Granatstein, The Weight of Command, 77-78.
Douglas Delaney, The Soldiers’ General: Bert Hoffmeister at War (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2005), 35.
7  
8  
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learners.9 In Douglas Delaney’s assessment: “Though not without
its shortcomings, the CJWSC did what it was designed to do: it
gave officers the technical tools they needed to manage battles and
prepare their soldiers for combat.”10
Moncel went through a rigorous period of theoretical and practical
staff training under the hawk-like gaze of Simonds. While it cannot
be said that Moncel had developed a comparable level of knowledge
to pre-war staff college graduates, he believed that the CJWSC
helped aspiring Canadian commanders become good brigadiers. In
his view, staff college provided officers with a better sense of interarms cooperation and how to use the resources available.11 As the
Canadian Army selected only sixty officers for this initial serial of the
CJWSC, Moncel’s selection for attendance was a clear indication of
the esteem in which he was held by the Canadian chain of command.
Moreover, he finished first on the course, which undoubtably paid
dividends when he served under Simonds’s command in II Canadian
Corps.12 But simply completing a wartime staff course provided no
guarantee for promotion. Moncel still had to demonstrate his ability
to apply what he had learned.
After completing staff college, Moncel held several staff officer
positions in Canadian formations. While he hated his first staff
appointment as the GSO III Liaison Officer between I Canadian Corps
HQ and British General HQ, it inadvertently led to an important
encounter with Brigadier F. F. Worthington, then commander of 1st
Canadian Army Tank Brigade (1st CATB).13 Moncel apparently made
a significant impression when he provided administrative support to
1st CATB during its transfer from Canada to Britain. Worthington
was so impressed that he arranged for Moncel to join his staff at 1st
CATB.14 Nominally a GSO III from June to December 1941, Moncel

9  
C. P. Stacey, Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 14 “Visit to Canadian
Junior War Staff Course,” 10 March 1941, accessed 10 October 2019, https://
www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/historyheritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports/military-headquarters-1940-1948/
canadian-junior-war-staff-course-visit.html.
10  
Delaney, The Soldiers’ General, 36. See also John A. MacDonald, “In Search of
Veritable: Training the Canadian Army Staff Officer, 1899 to 1945” (M.A. thesis,
Royal Military College of Canada, 1992), 123.
11  
Granatstein, Weight of Command, 81.
12  
Granatstein, Weight of Command, 78.
13  
Granatstein, Weight of Command, 78.
14  
“Young Officer Once with Vics,” Montreal Star, 6 February 1943, S6.
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spent most of that time with the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC)
training establishment in Bulford. The exact nature of his training is
unknown, but he likely attended individual training courses to develop
basic tactical armour knowledge. Moncel must have impressed his
superiors at the RAC training camp because Worthington promoted
him to acting major and appointed him brigade major (BM) when he
returned to 1st CATB in December 1941. Moncel transferred from the
infantry to the Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC) shortly thereafter.
Moncel did well as an armoured officer. Through late April
and early May 1942, 1st CATB participated in the anti-invasion
exercises Beaver III and Beaver IV. Following this, Lt.-Gen. Bernard
Montgomery, then commander of South Eastern Command, directed
Exercise Tiger, an eleven-day corps-level encounter battle.15 These
exercises provided Moncel an opportunity to apply the doctrinal
knowledge he gained from the CJWSC and the RAC training school
and he did so to good effect. When Montgomery inspected 1st CATB,
he rated Moncel “a very good BM.”16 Praise from Caesar was praise
indeed. As Montgomery’s report, which included numerous negative
assessments of other BMs and commanders, went to the commander
of I Canadian Corps, then Lt.-Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, it surely
impressed the future commander of First Canadian Army, which in
turn elevated Moncel’s prospects in the Canadian overseas forces.
His currency continued to rise. Following his tenure as the BM
1st CATB, Moncel transferred to 5th CAD in August 1942 as a GSO
II. Moncel’s move to a division suggests a normal progression through
more senior staff positions. He had gained experience at brigade level,
but still required further experience at division to refine and augment
his professional knowledge. Fifth CAD was a good place to do that.
The division had only just arrived in the United Kingdom and it still
did not have its full complement of tanks, so training for armoured
units initially focused on troop and squadron level, while the infantry
and artillery units conducted more advanced collective instruction.17

C. P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World
War, Vol. I: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain, and the Pacific
(Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1955), 243-44.
16  
Confidential Report on 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade by General B. L.
Montgomery Commander South Eastern Command Home Forces, dated 7 May 1942,
Papers of General H. D. G. Crerar, MG30 E157, vol. 2, Library and Archives Canada
(LAC).
17  
Stacey, Six Years of War, 245-46.
15  
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Moncel oversaw most of this training and he trained himself and his
headquarters as well. At division HQ, the staff conducted wireless
exercises without troops which helped iron out staff procedures. The
division also had additional integral artillery, engineers, combat
service support and service support formations and gaining practical
experience with these arms and services, even if only during wireless
exercises, undoubtedly gave Moncel a better sense of how brigades
and divisions fought. This experience complemented the theoretical
knowledge he had acquired at the CJWSC and practical experience
he had gained at 1st CATB. In his time at 1st CATB and 5th CAD,
Moncel developed a solid reputation as the Canadian Army took a
risk on him by appointing him to unit command despite very little
command experience.
Moncel’s January 1943 appointment as the commanding officer
(CO) of the Manitoba Dragoons, an armoured car regiment, marked
another logical step in his professional development, but not one
that radically altered his understanding of tactical doctrine. The
Manitoba Dragoons had only recently arrived in the England and
the unit lacked the necessary vehicles, equipment and experience
to conduct regimental level exercises. Moncel recognised this and
focused his efforts on individual- and troop-level training, as well
as the integration of the newly-promulgated corps reconnaissance
tactical doctrine.18 He also prioritised creating a solid regimental
leadership cadre. Officers whom he felt lacked the necessary
character to command were replaced with officers imported primarily
from Canada’s other armoured car regiment—the Royal Canadian
Dragoons. The purge was comprehensive: the second in command
(2IC), all of the squadron commanders and the regimental sergeant
major were replaced under Moncel.19 His actions produced results. In
April, Lt.-Gen. E. W. Sansom, then commander II Canadian Corps,
conducted a formal inspection of the regiment as part of a corpswide verification of unit and formation readiness. Moncel’s regiment
achieved the highest grades of any unit in II Canadian Corps. In
fact, Sansom was so impressed that, in August 1943, he selected

War Diary [hereafter WD], 18th Armoured Car Regiment (12th Manitoba
Dragoons), 6, 11 and 15 February 1943, RG24 C-3, vol. 14246, LAC.
19  
Granatstein, Weight of Command, 77; and WD, 18th Armoured Car Regiment
(12th Manitoba Dragoons), 6 April 1943 and 21 May 1943, RG24 C-3, vol. 14246,
LAC.
18  
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Moncel as his new GSO I, a senior staff position. Unit command
provided Moncel an opportunity to practice and perfect command
skills that so often go unused as a staff officer—skills that would be
important when he assumed command of 4th CAB.
But Moncel’s time as a CO hardly changed his doctrinal
understanding of how Anglo-Canadian forces fought. Learning and
implementing corps reconnaissance tactical doctrine augmented his
understanding of how armoured car regiments operated in battle
but it was not a fundamental departure from what he learned on
the CJWSC. The language he spoke and understood still came from
the FSRs.
Moncel’s appointment to II Canadian Corps marked his
introduction to Montgomery’s tactical doctrine through his protégé
Simonds. Simonds returned to England in January 1944 to take
command of II Canadian Corps from the unimpressive Sansom.
He cleaned house shortly after his arrival at II Canadian Corps in
February, replacing most of the fired officers with veterans of the
fighting in Sicily and Italy, but he kept Moncel as GSO I which
spoke volumes. Working for Simonds was fortuitous for Moncel as
it offered him an opportunity to be mentored by one of Canada’s
most talented and influential field commanders. Moreover, he
gained familiarity with the employment of corps, army and army
group assets—all handy knowledge for a future brigade commander.
In fact, by the end of May 1944, Moncel had so impressed the
demanding Simonds that the corps commander recommended him
for future brigade command.20
Having fought with the Eighth Army in Sicily and Italy, Simonds
was well-versed in Montgomery’s tactical doctrine, knowledge
that he imparted to Moncel. Nowhere was this more evident than
II Canadian Corps Operational Policy.21 This directive outlined
how Simonds understood corps operations and won the approval of

This nearly came to fruition shortly before D-Day after an intoxicated Brigadier
R. A. Wyman, Moncel’s former commander at 1st CATB and then commander
of 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, blurted out public comments about invasion
plans. Crerar decided to keep Wyman for operational reasons, but it was simply a
matter of time before Moncel received a brigade. Angelo Caravaggio, 21 Days in
Normandy: Maj. Gen. George Kitching & The 4th Canadian Armoured Division
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2016), 29.
21  
Terry Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of Command (Kingston: Canadian Defence
Academy Press, 2007), 10-17.
20  
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From left to right, Dempsey, Monty and Simonds in Antwerp on 16 October 1944. [Library
and Archives Canada PA-041620]

both Montgomery and Lt.-Gen. Miles Dempsey, the commander of
Second British Army. While Simonds expected Moncel to have a
comprehensive knowledge of this policy, it was not a radical departure
from what Moncel had previously learned. In fact, the language of
the FSRs primed him for this adaptation in doctrine, facilitating
his transition to Montgomery’s way of war. As II Canadian Corps
deployed to Normandy in July 1944, Moncel successfully applied
his adapted understanding of doctrine operationally. As the corps
operations officer, he played a critical part in the planning and
execution of some of Simonds’s major operations, including Totalize
(7–10 August 1944) and Tractable (14–21 August 1944)—operations
that typified set-piece tactical doctrine. While Moncel still made
good use of what he had learned during the war, he did have to
reconcile his professional knowledge of doctrine with that of Simonds
and Montgomery—something he put to good use in command of 4th

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol31/iss1/4
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Canadian Armoured Brigade, an appointment he received following
the death of Brigadier Leslie Booth during Tractable.22
Fortunately, the strategic situation allowed Moncel to ease his
way into brigade command. He took command of 4th CAB on 19
August 1944 in the final stages of the Normandy Campaign. Broken
but not defeated, the Germans conducted a month-long retreat to the
Belgian/Dutch/German borders in an attempt to re-establish a viable
defensive line against the advancing Allies. As 4th CAD participated
in the pursuit phase of Allied operations, Moncel commanded 4th
CAB during the crossing of the Seine at Elbeuf in late August and
at the Ghent Canal a week later. He also gained some experience
attacking from St. Omer to the Ghent Canal with a combined tankinfantry brigade group from 5 to 9 September. Following the retreating
Germans, 4th CAB cleared the area south of the Leopold Canal,
boxing in the Germans to the north. By 22 September 4th CAB had
assumed a static role, patrolling along the canal and engaging any
Germans who exposed themselves.23 While Moncel gained important
experience from August to October 1944, he had yet to command in
a major set-piece battle.

james jefferson
James Curry Jefferson was in many ways the social opposite of
Robert Moncel. Having immigrated at a young age from England,
his family settled in Edmonton, Alberta, where he attended school
and served as a private in the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (LER).
Jefferson dropped out of high school after Grade 10 to work with
the North Western Utilities company, where he progressed through
a number of low-level jobs until becoming a service manager.24 In
his militia career, Jefferson progressed through the ranks, eventually
earning a commission in 1927. His war service also followed a much
different path than Moncel’s. Jefferson attested on 4 September 1939
C. P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World
War, Vol. III: The Victory Campaign (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller
of Stationary, 1960), 240.
23  
Stacey, Victory Campaign, 367.
24  
For ease of reading, Jefferson’s regiment will be referred to as the Loyal Edmonton
Regiment throughout the paper, despite the fact that the regiment did not acquire
the prefix “Loyal” until July 1943.
22  
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as a major, sailing with 1st CID as a company commander in the
LER. Over the next two and a half years, he completed a number
of minor tactical courses, including an eleven-day battle drill course
in December 1941. Battle drill focused on simplified platoon tactics
and provided a clear explanation of the objectives to be achieved,
the principles involved and the individual task of each member of
the team.25 Jefferson learned the material and later established a
regimental battle school for the LER. While this provided Jefferson
with a foundation upon which to build his knowledge of tactical
doctrine, it did little to move him beyond company command.
Jefferson’s return to the LER after the completion of the battle
drill course coincided with a period of upheaval in the regiment.
At the end of February 1942, Montgomery inspected 2nd Canadian
Infantry Brigade (2nd CIB) and found it wanting in every respect
except for the quality of the other ranks. Without mentioning names,
he rated Jefferson and his fellow company commanders as “a very
poor lot.”26 Within five months the CO, 2IC and most of the company
commanders had left the regiment for other employment—likely
not of their own choosing.27 Jefferson remained, however, and rose
quickly. In April, he assumed the position of 2IC, replacing a major
whom Montgomery rated as “not a good solider. He is definitely unfit
to command a battalion.”28 Three months later, he became the acting
CO when Lt.-Col. E. B. Wilson received a similarly negative report
from Crerar.29
Jefferson’s completion of the Senior Officers’ School (SOS), from
May to June 1942, certainly helped his advancement. SOS had two
primary functions: to teach a common tactical doctrine based on the

W. Boss, Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 123 “Battle Drill Training,”
31 August 1944, accessed 10 October 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentnational-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-historylineages/reports/military-headquarters-1940-1948/battle-drill-training.html.
26  
Notes on Inf Bde of Canadian Corps – No. 5. 28 Feb 1942 – 2 Innf [sic] Bde.,
Papers of General H. D. G. Crerar, MG30 E157, vol. 1, LAC.
27  
WD, Loyal Edmonton Regiment [LER], 16 April 1941 and 4 July 1942, RG24 C-3,
vol. 15122, LAC.
28  
WD, LER, 4 July 1942, RG24 C-3, vol. 15122, LAC; and Notes on Inf Bde of
Canadian Corps – No. 5. 28 Feb 1942 – 2 Innf [sic] Bde., Papers of General H. D. G.
Crerar, MG30 E157, vol. 1, LAC.
29  
Recommendations for Promotion Officers, 1 Cdn Corps, 5 June 1942, Papers of
General H. D. G. Crerar, MG30 E157, vol. 1, LAC.
25  
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FSRs and to instruct officers in training their own subordinates.30
Candidates acquired the theoretical knowledge to command their
units much in the same way staff officers learned their trades through
their respective staff courses. At the same time, SOS students gained
insight into other branches of the army as the fellow candidates
usually included “men whose wide range of experience makes it
possible to obtain valuable views on an immense variety of subjects,
and on the different aspects assumed by the same problem under
varying conditions.”31 They also gained some understanding of
combined arms warfare or at least an idea of how other arms and
corps operated. But the Commandant of the SOS rated Jefferson’s
performance on the course as “Below Average” and that “[u]nder
school conditions, I consider that he has not the mental alertness
necessary for command.”32 Hardly the kind of report that would get
a major promoted to battalion command. The trouble was that a
minority of unit commanding officers actually attended SOS. And
those who completed SOS with Jefferson fared little better on their
reports.33 So being SOS-trained set Jefferson apart from the majority
of his cohort and set him up to assume permanent command of his
battalion in December 1942. Jefferson took to his new appointment
with great alacrity. From January to April 1943, he directed training
from platoon to battalion level. In May, the LER was well prepared to
start two months of battalion, brigade and division-level amphibious
exercises in preparation for Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily.34

David French, “Officer Education and Training in the British Regular Army, 19191939” in Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Gregory C. Kennedy
and Keith Neilson (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 111-12; A. P. Wavell,
“The Training of the Army for War,” Royal United Services Institution Journal 78,
510 (1933): 271; and James Alan Roberts, The Canadian Summer: The Memoirs of
James Alan Roberts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 39.
31  
H. R. Sandilands, “The Case for Senior Officers’ School,” Royal United Services
Institution Journal 73, 490 (1928): 236.
32  
Senior Officers’ School – Confidential Report, Jefferson, James Curry, 22 June
1942, RG24 C-3, vol. 10034, LAC.
33  
Senior Officers’ School Visit Report by M. H. S. Penhale, 26 June 1942, RG24
C-3, vol. 10034, LAC. Of the nine Canadian students on Jefferson’s SOS serial, five
were ranked as average, four were ranked as below average and one failed the course.
34  
WD, LER, May and June 1944, RG24 C-3, vol. 15122, LAC; G. W. L. Nicholson,
Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. II: The
Canadians In Italy – 1943-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of
Stationary, 1958), 42; and Delaney, The Soldiers’ General, 50-51, 55. The exercises
were Exercise Westshod (21–22 May 1943) and Exercise Stymie (18 June 1943).
30  
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While the CJWSC and SOS taught different skill sets, both
courses used the same tactical doctrine and language found in the
FSRs. SOS prepared Jefferson better for unit command than the
CJWSC could have, but the fundamentals of infantry battalion and
combined arms operations remained the same. And even though
Jefferson had an opportunity to conduct battalion level training,
this experience did not alter his understanding of doctrine. Just like
Moncel, the language he spoke and understood still came from the
doctrine outlined in the FSRs.
While SOS and command of the LER in a training environment
offered a platform to learn, operations in Sicily and Italy allowed
Jefferson to demonstrate his command competency. Tellingly,
Jefferson’s SOS course report had identified that he had “a determined
character, which would probably show up best in a tight corner.”35 He
did not disappoint. A detailed account of Jefferson’s command of the
LER from Pachino to Ortona (July–December 1943) is unnecessary
to understand that he led the LER competently and gained enormous
tactical experience. He received the Distinguished Service Order and
a bar for his actions at Leonforte and at Ortona. The citation for
Leonforte read:
Lt.-Col. Jefferson personally led a detachment of his battalion in clearing
the town with house-to-house fighting, destroying large numbers of the
enemy. The aggressive leadership of Lt.-Col. Jefferson resulted in the
subsequent capture of the town and his example was an inspiration to
his own men and the rest of the brigade.36

Jefferson received similar praise at Ortona, where he “displayed to
a superlative degree qualities essential in a commanding officer. His
calmness and cool disregard of danger were an inspiration to his
men. His unyielding determination, quick and accurate appreciation
and skillful leadership broke the enemy stand and ensured the
capture of Ortona.”37 In the six months that Jefferson commanded
the LER in operations, he developed strong tactical capabilities and

Senior Officers’ School – Confidential Report, Jefferson, James Curry, 22 June
1942, RG24 C-3, vol. 10034, LAC.
36  
“Citations Praise District Troops,” Edmonton Journal, 15 October 1943.
37  
“Credit Jefferson in Paving Way to Victory at Ortona,” Edmonton Journal, 12
April 1944.
35  
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a positive reputation amongst senior Canadian officers. At the same
time, he adapted his understanding of tactical doctrine to the FSR
dialect spoken by Simonds and Montgomery. Nowhere was this more
evident than the battle fought by 1st Canadian Division at Agira
between 24 and 28 July 1943. This operation typified the set-piece
tactical doctrine developed by Montgomery, who mentored Simonds,
who in turn indoctrinated the brigade and battalion commanders in
his division. Jefferson’s ability to absorb and successfully apply this
modified doctrine in this and subsequent battles was recognised by
his superiors. In February 1944, Crerar selected him for return to
England and command of the 10th CIB. This was part of Crerar’s
intention to integrate proven battlefield leaders into the green units of
First Canadian Army before the invasion of Normandy.38 Jefferson’s
selection signified an enormous vote of confidence from Crerar and
the rest of the chain of command.
But successful battalion command did not guarantee a smooth
transition to brigade command. Jefferson’s performance in the later
stages of the Normandy Campaign has received mixed reviews from
historians. John A. English argues that Canadian brigade commanders,
with the exception of Harry Foster, lacked sound tactical judgement.39
English specifically criticised Jefferson’s plan and conduct of 10th
CIB’s attack at Tilly-la-Campagne (1–5 August 1944).40 MajorGeneral George Kitching, on the other hand, considered Jefferson
an experienced and solid brigade commander.41 Angelo Caravaggio
supports this assessment, arguing that Jefferson provided adequate
and consistent leadership throughout the Normandy Campaign.42 At
any rate, he kept his brigade, which he would fight in conjunction
with Moncel’s in Operation Suitcase, and he undoubtedly learned
from his Normandy experience.

Stacey, Six Years of War, 417; and Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 33.
John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of
Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 307.
40  
English, The Canadian Army, 253-54.
41  
Caravaggio, 21 Days in Normandy, 31.
42  
Caravaggio, 21 Days in Normandy, 31.
38  
39  
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doctrine versus experience
The 4th CAD’s brigade commanders seemed to have been cast from
two very different molds. Jefferson was a shy and quiet man whose habit
of mulling over problems and questions was frequently perceived as a
lack of intelligence.43 Yet he had considerable operational experience
as an infantry battalion commander and had fought two major
engagements with 10th CIB. Moncel, quick-minded and outwardly
confident, on the other hand followed the staff route to command and
lacked operational command experience. Despite these differences,
though, they both had practical schooling in the Anglo-Canadian
set-piece attack and how to set it up. This mostly came during
their service under Simonds. Similar to Montgomery, Simonds’s
understanding of doctrine flowed from his time in the PF, at Staff
College in Camberley and as an instructor at the Royal Military
College. During his time in England, he developed an understanding
of Montgomery’s method as brigadier general staff of I Canadian
Corps (August 1941–September 1942) in South Eastern Army and
perfected it as GOC 1st CID (April–October 1943) in Eighth Army.
Simonds’s operational policy directive of February 1944 reflected the
method to a tee. Top-down control was critical to Simonds: “[e]ach
commander should explain to his immediate subordinates how he
visualized the tasks ‘two below his own command’ when he allots them
their tasks and issues his orders. […] Division artillery and engineers
should be centralized under the control of the CRA [Commander
Royal Artillery] and CRE [Commander Royal Engineers].”44 And
firepower was central: “attack(s) must be carefully organized and
supported by all available artillery.”45 Simonds, like Montgomery,
believed that divisional operations should be phased accordingly
and carefully: “The leading brigade, operating from a firm base,
can act with great boldness” while at the same time preparing for
the “defeat of German counter-attacks.”46 Moncel, who was toiling
away as a GSO I in Simonds’s headquarters, and Jefferson, who
was commanding a brigade in one of Simonds’s divisions, read and

Caravaggio, 21 Days in Normandy,
Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of
45  
Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of
46  
Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of
43  
44  

29.
Command, 13, 16.
Command, 14.
Command, 13.
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absorbed this doctrinal method as they trained for and fought in
Operation Overlord. It showed in the Scheldt.

operation suitcase
The Canadian operations in the Scheldt have been examined in great
detail in many other works.47 Only a brief sketch is required here to
set the context for a comparison of the battles fought by Moncel
and Jefferson. Fourth CAD moved from the Leopold Canal to the
northeast of Antwerp in mid-October 1944 to support Montgomery’s
operations to open the port of Antwerp. The commander of 21st Army
Group intended to use I and XII British Corps to trap and destroy
Fifteenth German Army which continued to occupy a defensive line
from Woensdrecht to s’Hertogenbosch (see Map 1).48 On I British
Corps’s left flank, the corps commander, Lt.-Gen. Sir John Crocker,
ordered Major-General Harry Foster, commander 4th CAD, to push
back German forces in front of 2nd CID at Woensdrecht (see Map
2).49 This would allow 2nd CID to attack into South Beveland and
complete II Canadian Corps’s operation to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
The terrain in northern Belgium and southern Holland lent itself
to the German defence, presenting significant challenges for both
Moncel and Jefferson. Fifteenth Army had spent almost two months
building defensive positions along 4th CAD’s front. This included
well-sighted anti-tank gun positions, anti-personnel and anti-tank
mines, booby traps and other obstacles. Many of these defensive
47  
See R. W. Thompson, Eighty Five Days: The Story of the Battle of the Scheldt
(London: Hutchinson of London, 1957); Mark Zuehlke, Terrible Victory - First
Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign: September 13 – November 6,
1944 (Madeira Park, BC: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007); J. L. Moulton, Battle for
Antwerp: The Liberation of the City and the Opening of the Scheldt, 1944 (London:
I. Allen, 1978); Graham A. Thomas, Attack on the Scheldt: The Struggle for Antwerp
1944 (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2017); Terry Copp, Cinderella Army:
The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2006), 85-174; Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 358-421; Nicholas Wheeler, “I
British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt: A Reassessment,” Canadian Military
History 28, 2 (2018): 1-34; and Nicholas Wheeler, “Forgotten Battle: A Command
Analysis of Lieutenant-General Sir John Crocker GoC I British Corps 23 September
– 8 November 1944,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 18, 4 (2019): 1-37.
48  
Wheeler, “I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt,” 8.
49  
I British Corps, Operation Instruction No. 17, 17 October 1944, RG24 C17, vol.
10790, LAC.
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Map 1. Front line 16 October 1944.

positions took advantage of heavily wooded areas and the narrow
roads and trails that concentrated any vehicle movement that ran
through them. To further complicate offensive operations, the watersaturated ground restricted tank movement to the roads in many
areas. Fourth CAD’s principal enemy during the advance to Esschen
was the 346th German Division, consisting of approximately 8,000
men in four infantry regiments.50 As the division turned northwest
to Bergen Op Zoom they faced an ad hoc battle group of the 6th
Parachute Regiment and self-propelled guns from the 85th Division
commanded by Lt.-Gen. Kurt Chill.
On 19 October 1944, Foster laid out his plan for Operation
Suitcase but gave Moncel and Jefferson a great deal of flexibility
in determining how to execute their individual operations. He
Canadian Military Headquarters, Special Interrogation Report –Lieutenant
General Erich Diestel, 9, Kardex, 981.065, Directorate of History and Heritage.
Diestel’s division also absorbed regiments from the 70th and 711th Divisions.

50  
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broke the initial phase of the operation into two stages. In the first
stage, Moncel’s 4th CAB would clear four kilometres to Dorp and
Punt Heuvel, where it would establish a firm base. Concurrently,
Jefferson’s 10th CIB would clear the area just north of Camp de
Brasschaet on the left flank and then up to Achterbroek, just east
of Dorp. In the second stage, to be executed in unison with the 49th
(West Riding) Division’s advance on the right, both brigades would
advance to capture the Roosendaal Canal. To enable his brigadiers,
Foster reorganised the division into two balanced brigade groups.
Fourth CAB consisted of the Lake Superior Regiment (LSR) and
the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Argyll’s) with the
Canadian Grenadier Guards (CGG) and Governor General’s Foot
Guards (GGFG) as armour support. 10th CIB had the same infantryarmour balance with the Algonquin Regiment (Algonquins) and the
Lincoln and Welland Regiment (L&W) as the infantry and the
South Alberta Regiment (SAR) and the British Columbia Regiment
(BCR) as the armour. Though Foster centralised command of the
division’s artillery under the CRA, he allocated specific units to
support each brigade group and allowed his brigadiers to determine
how to best employ them.51 Each received a battery of self-propelled
anti-tank guns and light anti-aircraft artillery with an additional
towed anti-tank (AT) troop to 10th CIB.52 For indirect fire, Moncel
had the 23rd Field Regiment and 84th Medium Regiment in
support while Jefferson relied upon 15th Canadian Field Regiment
and 121st Medium Regiment.53 Notwithstanding the direction to
establish firm bases at Punt Huevel and Achterbroek, Foster left
it to his brigadiers to organise their forces, plan and achieve their
objectives within the constraints of his intent. Given this flexibility,
Moncel and Jefferson could have organised and fought their forces
along similar or divergent lines.
Similarities in planning emerged early when Moncel and Jefferson
organised their forces in a near identical manner. Jefferson deployed
10th CIB with two infantry battalions forward, each supported by an
armoured regiment. Similarly, Moncel fought with his two infantry
Lawrence N. Smith, The History of the 23rd Field Regiment (S.P.) RCA, April
1942 to May 1945 (self published), 53.
52  
WD, Headquarters, RCA 4 Canadian Armoured Division [HQ, RCA 4 CAD], 18
October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 14331, LAC.
53  
HQ, RCA 4 CAD Op Instr No. 4 OP SUITCASE, 19 October 1944, RG24 C3,
vol. 14331, LAC.
51  
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Map 2. Fourth Canadian Armoured Division’s advance to the Roosendaal Canal, 20-21
October 1944.
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battalions forward, each supported by a squadron of tanks from the
CGG, with the final CGG squadron in reserve.54 On his left, Moncel
deployed the GGFG to provide flank security and indirect fire. Moncel
and Jefferson opted not to employ rolling barrage fire. Instead, they
used their supporting artillery regiments in a counter-battery role
for thirty minutes before the start of the attack to neutralise known
German artillery batteries and mortars. Once the attack started,
those guns shifted to on-call tasks for concentrated fire as necessary.
As the two brigades advanced, the operations unfolded in a similar
fashion. In 4th CAB’s initial thrusts, the LSR secured its initial
objective at Punt Heuvel by 0830 hrs.55 Instead of exploiting, Moncel
ordered the LSR to firm up their position. Establishing this firm
base helped support the advance of the Argylls which faced stiffer
resistance over more difficult terrain.56 On its right flank, in the 10th
CIB sector, the L&W faced early difficulties during the advance, but
by midnight they had secured the town of Kruisstraat.57 Immediately
to the east, the Germans had pinned the Algonquins in the woods
just north of their start line. Recognising the futility of this advance,
Jefferson ordered the L&W to establish a firm base at Kruisstraat
while the Algonquins disengaged on their front and manoeuvred
up to the L&W position, from which they would leapfrog forward.
By midnight on 20 October, Foster had authorised the execution
of the next stage. Resistance weakened on 4th CIB’s front during
the night and by mid-morning on 21 October both of its battalions
had established hasty defensive positions on the Roosendaal Canal,
which in fact was a large ditch.58 Jefferson pushed his lead elements
throughout the night and established firm bases on the north side of
the canal with the Algonquins.59 Both brigades had achieved their
WD, Headquarters, 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade [HQ, 4th CAB], 19-20
October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 14051, LAC.
55  
George Stanley, In the Face of Danger: The History of the Lake Superior Regiment
(Port Arthur: The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment, 1960), 209.
56  
H. M. Jackson, ed., The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess
Louise’s): 1928-1953 (Montreal: Industrial School for the Deaf, 1953), 135.
57  
R. L. Rogers, History of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment (Montreal: Industrial
Shops for the Deaf, 1954), 195.
58  
Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 110; and Jackson, The Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, 135. While the 4th CAD war diary for 21 October indicates that both
the LSR and Argylls faced stiff resistance when crossing the Roosendaal Canal, both
official histories indicate that German resistance had weakened on this day.
59  
G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment 1939-1945 (Toronto:
Ryerson Press, 1948), 173.
54  
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objectives and firmed up their positions in preparation for their
attacks on Esschen.
Instead of adopting differing approaches during the first phase
of Suitcase, their planning and execution reflected a common
understanding of doctrine held by the two brigadiers. Organisationally,
they both advanced with balanced infantry-tank force structures, even
if Moncel had only two squadrons of tanks with the lead elements
compared to the two regiments in 10th CIB. It was an adroit move
by Moncel as restrictive terrain along his axis of advance prevented
the full deployment of his tanks. By deploying the GGFG to the
west, he secured his left flank and still found a way to use all the
firepower at his disposal. Tanks used in an indirect role was not
ideal, but it was better than leaving them out of battle.
Their use of artillery also made doctrinal sense. As the Germans
had opted to mitigate their numerical inferiority by occupying
wood lines, delay positions and communication centres, no welldefined defensive line existed that could be suppressed by barrage
fire. By employing their artillery in the counter-battery role while
retaining its flexibility for on-call fire, Moncel and Jefferson efficiently
concentrated fire from their supporting artillery on the German forces
facing them. Both were prepared to use overwhelming artillery fire
to support their advance—they simply did not need it.60 This was an
effective use of the artillery resources at hand which still adhered to
Montgomery’s tactical doctrine.
Limited objectives and operating from firm bases featured
prominently in Moncel’s and Jefferson’s operations as well. When the
L&W had secured Kruisstraat, Jefferson ordered them to establish a
firm base instead of exploiting further north. With the brigade’s front
secured, he had the Algonquins bypass the German forces further
south and move through the L&W to the Roosendaal Canal. Moncel
executed operations in a similar manner. When the LSR and Argylls
arrived at the Roosendaal Canal early on 21 October, they faced little
opposition and likely could have exploited their gains but Moncel
directed them to consolidate on their position to allow 10th CIB
to move up on 4th CAB’s right flank. This in turn provided flank
protection for both brigades. Though cautious, this method of attack
Smith, 23rd Field Regiment, 53. Smith describes the list of concentrations on call
as “huge.” This suggests that if either Moncel or Jefferson required heavy artillery
support, it was at their disposal.

60  
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ensured that the brigades advanced in mutually supporting roles and
had sufficient fire support to seize their objectives—hallmarks of
Montgomery’s tactical doctrine.
They continued to fight in this manner through the next stage
of operations. On 21 October, Foster ordered 4th CAB to secure a
prominent wood southeast of Esschen while 10th CIB cleared the
village proper (see Map 2). Speed was of the essence so Moncel had
only four hours to prepare and initiate his attack, Jefferson five. To
get to Esschen quickly, Jefferson directed his two infantry battalions
to advance single file during the night so that they would be ready
for an attack at first light. Jefferson also laid on harassing fire to
support the infantry during their rapid and somewhat risky advance.
Meanwhile, the BCR, with flail and flamethrower tanks in the
lead, cleared the main north-south route to Esschen. By morning,
both battalions were on the outskirts of the town, which, with the
support of concentrated artillery, they overran by noon. At this point
Jefferson, true to the set-piece doctrine, consolidated his objective and
hardened its defences when he brought forward both the BCR tanks
and AT guns, which allowed him to defeat enemy counterattacks
without difficulty.61
Moncel executed a similar operation. The LSR and Argylls
conducted a night move like 10th CIB in hopes of reaching their
objectives undetected.62 With no major north-south route along
his axis of advance, Moncel re-tasked the CGG tanks to provide
left flank security with two squadrons while the third squadron
conducted indirect shoots under artillery direction.63 By first light
the infantry had achieved its objectives in the woods southwest of
Esschen and consolidated hasty defences. By last light, the brigade
had secured the Huijbergen-Esschen road, effectively cutting off
Esschen from the west. Once again, the consolidation of the brigade
proved critical as Moncel’s forces defeated at least one determined
German counterattack.64

WD, Headquarters, 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade [HQ, 10th CIB], 22 October
1944, RG24 C3, vol. 14155, LAC.
62  
Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 211. For example, the LSR moved off in single file
with B company leading, followed by A company, the AT platoon and D company.
63  
A. Fortescue Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards: 1760-1964
(Montreal: Gazette Printing Company Ltd, 1965), 303.
64  
WD, HQ, 4th CAB, 22 October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 14051, LAC.
61  
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In the attack to Esschen, Moncel and Jefferson fought their
brigades entirely in line with Montgomery’s set-piece attack doctrine.
In this respect, the advance to Esschen reflected what Moncel and
Jefferson learned in staff college, SOS and experiences with Simonds.
Even though the dialect of Montgomery’s tactical doctrine required
some adaptation on the part of Moncel and Jefferson, the language
remained the same. Their plans adopted a deliberate approach, using
sequenced phases, setting limited objectives, operating from firm bases,
consolidating objectives before exploiting any gains and employing
artillery to support attacks and defeat counterattacks.65 Just prior to
the start of the attack, the CRA conducted two shoots with all of the
divisional artillery and 59th Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) to
support the initial brigade advances. In both stages of the operation,
Moncel and Jefferson focused on securing limited objectives so they
could operate from firm bases as they continued forward. This
deliberate method also ensured that the brigades always had adequate
fire support—direct and indirect, planned or on call—before moving.
Both 4th CAB and 10th CIB employed a series of harassing fire
programs; for example, during their advance to Esschen. But when
they consolidated on their final objectives, Jefferson and Moncel
employed heavy artillery fire to break up counterattacks on their
positions. Quick consolidation on objectives also allowed them to
fight off successive German counterattacks.
The similarities between Moncel and Jefferson extended to their
analytical capabilities, plans, orders and their general understanding
of operations. Both brigade commanders passed orders verbally and,
based on the war diary accounts and regimental histories, developed
simple plans. One is hard pressed to find anything complicated about
either brigade’s advance to Esschen and their battle procedure—how
they planned their battles, passed on orders and executed plans was
near identical.66 They received their orders to secure Esschen at 1900
hrs on 21 October and they both coordinated with their divisional
artillery representatives and disseminated fire plans to their brigades
for the advance on the town. With an earlier H-Hour, Jefferson
and the division artillery representative at 10th CIB created a fire
plan in only thirty minutes and successfully delivered it to forward
Douglas E. Delaney, “Hoffmeister in his Proving Ground: Sicily, July–August
1943,” Canadian Military History 12, 3 (2003): 25.
66  
Cassidy, Warpath, 174.
65  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2022

27

Canadian Military History, Vol. 31 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 4
28

Doctrine, Training and Education in the Development of Canadian Brigadiers

observation officers who were already advancing towards Esschen
with the infantry.67 The entire process took only three hours from
the reception of division orders. Despite their different backgrounds,
Moncel and Jefferson both demonstrated an ability to analyse orders
from division, develop brigade plans, coordinate the necessary support
for their operation and issue appropriate orders to their units—all
in a very short period of time. Far from teaching them to fight
differently, their different paths to brigade command actually taught
them a common way of developing solutions to tactical problems and
conveying those solutions in a common language.
The final phase of Operation Suitcase again confirms the
dominant influence of tactical doctrine on Moncel and Jefferson. With
the Germans withdrawing north, I British Corps sought to press their
advantage. Fourth CAD’s intelligence summary assessed that any
counterattacks would likely be no larger than battalion strength but
possibly supported by tanks. According to division intelligence, the
bulk of the remaining German forces in the area were concentrated
in Bergen Op Zoom. From here, they could fix 2nd CID, preventing
it from clearing South Beveland (see Map 3).68 Given this assessment,
Foster ordered Moncel to attack Wouwsche Plantage at 0800 hrs on
23 October. Capturing the town meant 4th CAB could use it as a
firm base to attack north, cutting the Bergen Op Zoom-Roosendaal
road and isolating German forces in the west. Once relieved in
Esschen by the 49th (West Riding) Division, Jefferson would move
to Huijbergen, approximately five miles southeast of his objective of
Bergen Op Zoom. With both towns secured, 2nd CID could attack
into South Beveland without German interference. Once again,
Moncel and Jefferson had flexibility to develop plans independently
as Foster’s direction was succinct—capture Wouwsche Plantage and
Bergen Op Zoom.69 In the end, they did not deviate too far from the
pattern set by the doctrinal template.
Moncel developed a relatively bold plan to take advantage of
the tactical situation. As the Argylls with the CGG secured a
start line on the other side of the Belgian-Dutch border, the LSR

Spencer, History of the Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment, 175.
4th Canadian Armoured Division – General Staff [4th CAD – GS], Int[elligence]
Summary Number 23, 2359 hrs 22 October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC.
69  
WD, 4th CAD – GS, 4 Cdn Armd Div Op Instr Number 13, 25 October 44, RG24
C3, vol. 13788, LAC.
67  
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https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol31/iss1/4

28

Wheeler: Doctrine, Training and Education in the Development of Canadian Brigadiers
WHEELER

29

Map 3. The advance on Esschen, 22 October 1944.

and GGFG with flails, engineers and self-propelled anti-tank guns
would “take the town on the gallop.” 70 If the Germans held the town
in strength, the LSR and GGFG would firm up while the Argylls
passed through and secured the town.71 For artillery, Simonds
tasked both the 4th and 59th AGRA to provide direct support to
4th CAB’s attack.72 Given Moncel’s belief that the German defence
was collapsing, he likely felt the combination of two infantry
battalions, two armoured regiments and the significant fire support

Foster, Steady the Buttons, 205; and Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 213.
HQ, 4th CAB, 22 October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC.
72  
HQ, 4th CAB, 22 October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC. While the war
diary entry does not specify that Simonds provided this direction, as the acting
commander of First Canadian Army, he was the only officer who had the authority
to do so.
70  
71  
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offered by two AGRAs would easily overwhelm whatever German
forces remained in the town.73
The attack did not unfold as Moncel had planned. After an
exceedingly quiet night, he must have felt that his brigade would face
minimal resistance from the retreating Germans.74 Moncel was wrong.
The Argylls and the CGG came under heavy enemy artillery fire as
they attempted to secure the start line, inflicting heavy casualties
with at least one Highlander company essentially destroyed.75 The
main attack fared little better. As the LSR and GGFG advanced
up the road towards the town, scathing small arms fire, AT fire
and artillery scattered the infantry and destroyed ten of the eleven
GGFG tanks. By the end of the day, the LSR had established a hasty
defensive position a mile southeast of Wouwsche Plantage, reinforced
with an AT platoon that Moncel had deployed to secure a firm base.76
Foster, under pressure from Crocker, directed Moncel to capture
the town as soon as possible on 24 October. Recognising that the
Germans intended to mount a strong defence in Wouwsche Plantage,
Moncel quickly adapted his plan to capture the town. His plan called
for two troops of the CGG with the LSR security platoon to pass
through the firm base established by the LSR and “crack off” to the
outskirts of the town at night.77 With the outskirts secured by first
light, two companies of the Argylls would break into the town and
clear it. Fifteen minutes prior to the start of the attack, two AGRAs
would target the approaches to the town while the town itself would
receive the full weight of this fire as 4th CAB began their advance.78
Unfortunately, the attack unfolded much in the same way as the
previous day. The earlier experience of the GGFG convinced Moncel
to attempt a cross-country approach to the town. But the heavy
rain overnight turned the terrain into a quagmire that delayed the
CGG tanks and LSR carriers. Although the tanks managed to get
within 200 yards of the town, they eventually became immobilised
WD, 4th CAD – GS, 22 October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC. The war diarist
identifies many Germans were left behind during 4th CAD’s rapid advance and that
the division had captured 450 prisoners of war. He then identifies that 4th CAB had
suffered no casualties during the night and then quotes Moncel as stating “their tails
are up” in reference to the desire of his troops to continue the attack.
74  
WD, 4th CAD – GS, 23 October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC.
75  
Jackson, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 138.
76  
Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 214.
77  
WD, HQ, 4th CAB, 23 October 1944 RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC.
78  
WD, HQ, 4th CAB, 23 October 1944 RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC.
73  
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Map 4: 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade, 23-26 October. 1) 23 October LSR and GGFG attack
stopped 1 mile SE of Wouwse Plantage; 2) 24 October CGG and LSR continue attack; 3) 2526 October LSR and L&W break into the town and clear it over two days.

by either the mud or AT fire. Pushing forward without tank support,
the Argylls now faced the task of both securing the outskirts and
clearing the town. Fierce German resistance stopped the Argyll
assault cold and forced the regiment to withdraw to a position half a
mile southeast of the town.79 Moncel tried to send up additional CGG
tanks and flamethrowers, but they too were driven back.80 While
4th CAB failed to capture Wouwsche Plantage, they at least gained
a firm base much closer to the town. From here, the LSR attacked
from the northeast and the south, while the newly attached L&W
Jackson, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 139.
Jackson, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 139.

79  
80  
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Regiment attacked two companies forward from the southeast, both
supported by two squadrons of GGFG tanks.81 While the previous
three days of fighting had taken its toll on the Germans, they still
managed to hold onto parts of the town until the late afternoon of
26 October.82
Moncel’s actions fully conformed to tactical doctrine. In the first
attack on Wouwsche Plantage, he attempted to secure a firm base
for the combined infantry-armour team to advance on the town. At
the start of the attack, the entire weight of the two AGRAs executed
“soften up” fire missions to neutralise the Germans in the town.83
When the attack failed, Moncel had the LSR consolidate, which he
reinforced with AT guns to support subsequent operations. One can
hardly fault Moncel for trying to rapidly secure Wouwsche Plantage
with a concentrated strike given the intelligence assessment that there
would be little resistance east of Bergen Op Zoom and the pressure
from Foster and Crocker to maintain the advance. At the same time,
sending the attack in at 0800 hrs in broad daylight was probably a
mistake. During the night of 23 to 24 October, Moncel directed an
extensive harassing fire program on the town while he quickly adjusted
his plan for the next attack. To his credit, he recognised the futility of
using armour on the main route. Instead, he attempted to manoeuvre
them cross country at night to mitigate the danger of the German
AT guns. Though it failed, 4th CAB managed to establish a position
closer to the town, which they used the next day to break into and
eventually clear Wouwsche Plantage. Throughout the four-day battle,
Moncel fully resourced his attacks with the available armour, artillery
and additional assets at his disposal. Although aggressive at times,
he adhered to the principles of the set-piece attack—simple plans
that operated from firm bases supported by artillery fire designed to
attrite the enemy.
As 4th CAB cleared Wouwsche Plantage, 10th CIB prepared
to advance to Bergen Op Zoom. On the morning of 25 October,
Foster directed 10th CIB to capture the town the following day.
Much like Moncel, Jefferson had to operate in very difficult and
well-defended terrain. This prompted him to develop a cautious plan
to capture the objective. Jefferson directed the brigade to execute a
Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 215.
WD, HQ, 4th CAB, 26 October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC.
83  
WD, HQ, RCA 4 CAD, 23 October 1944, RG24 C3, vol. 13788, LAC.
81  
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https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol31/iss1/4

32

Wheeler: Doctrine, Training and Education in the Development of Canadian Brigadiers
WHEELER

33

Map 5: 10 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 25-27 October. 1) 25 October SAR attempts to seize
Bergen Op Zoom but faces heavy resistance and is forced to withdraw. 2) 26-27 October 10
CIB attacks along 3 main axis—SAR and Coy L&W along the Bergen Op Zoom-Hujibergen
road, ASH and Coy L&W on the right flank of the SAR, and the ALQ, BCR, Coy L&W into
the centre of the woods and along the Wouwse Plantage-Bergen Op Zoom road.

three-pronged attack based on balanced teams of infantry, tanks,
flails and flamethrowers. One company of the L&W with a squadron
of SAR tanks would attack up the main route towards the town. To
protect their right flank, Jefferson tasked the Argylls with a squadron
of SAR to clear the woods while a company of the Algonquins and
L&W with a squadron of SAR tanks would secure Centrum. At the
north edge of the woods, two companies of the Algonquins with a
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company of the L&W and the BCR would advance west along the
Zoom River towards Bergen Op Zoom.84
As 10th CIB began its advance on 26 October, the Germans
executed their final delaying operations before they withdrew to
their new defensive line further north. All three prongs of the attack
encountered an endless success of mines, booby traps and concealed
AT guns. Along the main route, the L&W and SAR fought a
combined infantry/armour/flamethrower battle and slowly pushed the
German forces back, establishing a firm base approximately two miles
southeast of Bergen Op Zoom. At Centrum, the Germans managed
to cut off the combined Algonquin, L&W and SAR group, resulting in
a pitched battle that necessitated heavy artillery fire to support their
withdrawal. Finally, the Algonquins and BCR successfully captured a
German strong point located in a brickwork building at the northeast
corner of Wouwsche Woods. Instead of exploiting this success, they
supported the cut off force at Centrum. The following day, German
forces completed their withdrawal and 10th CIB occupied Bergen Op
Zoom unopposed.
Jefferson’s handling of 10th CIB was remarkably similar to
how Moncel fought 4th CAB at Wouwsche Plantage. Jefferson
demonstrated an appropriate level of caution when advancing to
Bergen Op Zoom. Prior to 10th CIB consolidating at Huijbergen, the
CO of the SAR, Lt.-Col. Gordon Wotherspoon, approached Jefferson
with a plan to crack into Bergen Op Zoom and unhinge the entire
German defensive line. After conferring with Foster, Jefferson rejected
the plan. While Wotherspoon may have felt that it was a missed
opportunity, Jefferson likely made the right decision to hold back
and conduct a set-piece operation.85 Given the situation at Wouwsche
Plantage, Jefferson knew the Germans were still mounting an effective
defence and an unsupported advance through a heavily defended and
mined narrow defile into Bergen Op Zoom would require Jefferson
to accept a significant amount of risk. His decision to execute a
relatively uncomplicated three-prong attack provided flexibility and
prevented the Germans from concentrating their forces at a single

Cassidy, Warpath, 181; Donald E. Graves, South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment
at War (Toronto: Robin Brass Studios, 1998), 226; and Rogers, History of the Lincoln
and Welland Regiment, 199.
85  
Geoffrey Hayes, The Lincs: A History of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment at
War (Strafford: The Beacon Herald, 1986), 63.
84  
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point—as they had done at Wouwsche Plantage. Balanced teams
allowed his forces to deal with the German defenders and, despite
the poor terrain, Jefferson did his best to ensure that each prong
of his attack mutually supported the other. As demonstrated by the
action at Centrum, the Algonquins and BCR force tasked to advance
west had sufficient flexibility to redirect its efforts towards relieving
the forces in the town. All of this evidence suggests that Jefferson
planned and executed operations based on set-piece battle approach.

conclusion
Despite their different career paths, evidence suggests that doctrine
had a dominant influence on how Moncel and Jefferson fought their
brigades. Moncel, the consummate staff officer, fought his brigade
just as well as the experienced Jefferson. At the same time, Jefferson
effectively coordinated the brigade, division and corps resources
available to him to achieve success on the battlefield—even though
Moncel had gained greater experience working with these assets as a
staff officer. In the end, few differences existed in 4th CAB and 10th
CIB operations during Operation Suitcase. Deliberate and simple
plans focused on the use of balanced combined arms teams to secure
and consolidate on limited objectives. From these consolidated
positions, Moncel and Jefferson defeated German counterattacks
then executed subsequent operations from these firm bases.
Throughout, they utilised indirect and direct fire to support their
advance and to attrite German forces. Doctrine, originating from the
FSRs and disseminated through training and the influence of officers
such as Simonds and Montgomery, provided a common language
by which Jefferson and Moncel planned and executed operations.
Experience, whether it be command or staff, mattered but it did not
necessarily change how commanders understood doctrine. However,
the conclusions reached in this study are limited to both this battle
and these individuals. Other commanders very well may have fought
their brigades differently given their experiences. That said, Moncel’s
and Jefferson’s individual training and practical experience proved
foundational and remarkably common in their effects.
◆

◆
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